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Abstract
This paper evaluates the attempt to create public goods via microfi-
nance loans. Microfinance loans in the production of goods with public
goods characteristics signify an emergent micro-privatisation. As a case
study, the production of water and sanitation resources via microfinance
loans is examined in India and Vietnam. It is found that microfinance
projects for water and sanitation, which are based on individualism and
a cost-recovery paradigm, ignore important collective action aspects and
underlying distributional problems. Given its questionable effectiveness in
other areas, the public goods iteration of microfinance leads not only to in-
suffi cient provision for the poor, but also may alienate these citizens from
publicly accountable modes of governance and their human right to water.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The current economic crisis was preceded, like many before it, by a great overex-
tension of credit. The unloading of credit onto poor borrowers traditionally
regarded as uncreditworthy was organised through the “innovative”means of
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), which ultimately became one of the cor-
nerstones of the crisis that sent the world into turmoil. Another financial tool,
which in recent years has been heralded as an innovation in lending to the tra-
ditionally uncreditworthy, is microfinance. The microfinance sector is one in
which state bodies and private investors play the role of creditor for poor peo-
ple who are expected to better their lot by undertaking business ventures and
repaying the money at profitable rates, following the neoliberal paradigm of full
cost-recovery in a micro-application to development assistance.
In this contribution, we examine a relatively recent extension to that classic
model (micro-entrepreneurship finance) in which microfinance lending is di-
rected towards enhancing or replacing the public sector as provider of public
goods. Microfinance’s inroads into public goods provision are a natural exten-
sion of the original concept as espoused by the father figure of modern micro-
finance, Muhammad Yunus. Yunus has argued that “government, as we now
know it, should pull out of most things except for law enforcement, the jus-
tice system, national defense, and foreign policy, and let the private sector, a
"Grameenized private sector", a social-consciousness-driven private sector, take
over its other functions." (Yunus 2003: 204) Microfinance for public goods rep-
resents a micro-privatisation of these goods; a post-capitalist privatisation drive
which, far from any progressive trajectory, may be symptomatic of a “refeudal-
isation of the economy”(Neckel 2010) as the poor become dependent on their
creditors for access to essential public goods.
We argue here first from theory, and then present empirical evidence, that mi-
crofinance is an insuffi cient and potentially ineffective tool for providing public
goods. In the next section we proceed by explaining the concept of microfi-
nance against its political economy background. In Section 3, we examine the
settings and assumptions underlying proposals to use microfinance for the pro-
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vision of public goods. We explain the theory that microfinance could represent
a means for financing water and sanitation, and develop from theory a counter-
argument that water and sanitation cannot effectively be governed and supplied
using private credit and an individualistic approach, because they are resources
with important public goods characteristics. In Section 4, we present empiri-
cal evidence from a field study in Vietnam and from own fieldwork in Andhra
Pradesh, which points to collective action problems and larger regulatory and
institutional failures not addressed by microfinance-funded approaches. Finally,
we conclude with a statement on the human right to water, and ways forward
beyond the cost-recovery paradigm.
2 BACKGROUND
The developmental state is “in turmoil”since the 1980s. Against the background
of a political economy of development grounded in liberalisation, debt recovery,
privatisation and declining international development assistance, microfinance
has occupied an increasingly central position in transnational development ef-
forts. With at least US$ 65.2 billion (Mixmarket), the global microfinance loan
portfolio in 2009 exceeded the volume of the entire United States, UK, German
and French foreign aid budgets combined1 . Microfinance institutions (MFIs)2
have proven their capacity to earn substantial profits; the largest five MFIs in
India, the world’s biggest microfinance market, posted an average yearly re-
turn on equity from 2005 to 2009 of 36.9 percent3 . However, it is becoming
increasingly apparent from empirical studies that microfinance loans fail as a
1These four largest donors posted a development assistance budget of 63,230 Million USD
in 2009, contributing more than half of all DAC-registered foreign aid (OECD 2010). Some
state-directed microfinance investments count towards this aid total.
2The word institution is not used in the sociological sense. The common terminology of re-
ferring to those organisations which deal in microfinance as “institutions”, which is something
of a misnomer as they are actually organisations, is adhered to for simplicity.
3Mixmarket (2009a). Own calculation using mixmarket data to determine a 5-year
weighted average for the 2009 five largest MFIs in India: SKS, Spandana, Share, Bandhan
and AML.
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tool for economic development and social empowerment (for an in-depth dis-
cussion, see Bateman 2010).4 The small loans are commonly understood as a
means for fighting poverty by harnessing the entrepreneurial energy of the poor;
they replace social policies and transfer programmes with small finance aimed
at encouraging the poor to undertake entrepreneurial activities. In their sum,
these activities are expected to create economic development through individ-
ual micro-entrepreneurship —a questionable expectation, as illustrated by the
continued slow growth of countries like Bangladesh in three decades of extensive
microfinance, and by the fact that in those successful developing countries of
those same decades, the microfinance model has played no role whatsoever. To
the contrary, these countries have very successfully reduced poverty and have
grown rich(er) overwhelmingly by using a range of state coordinated policy in-
terventions, financial institutions and investment strategies that are not only
the complete opposite of today’s ‘new wave’microfinance model, but also —
and this is the rub for those in the microfinance industry that might argue for
‘policy co-existence’—very likely to be undermined by the proliferation of micro-
finance and its prior claim over savings and other important financial resources.
(Bateman/Chang 2009: 5)
The concept of microfinance as a tool for development is fraught with diffi culties
arising from reasons as diverse as the fungibility of loans, high interest rates, the
limited entrepreneurial opportunities for poor people (Karnani 2009), predatory
lending practices, a lack of essential public goods, and the anti-developmental
macro- and micro-economic environments of poor communities defined by a
highly unequal control of factors of production and quasi-feudal social relations.
The achievements claimed on the part of microfinance look particularly question-
able against the background of the microfinance crisis that began in September
2010 in Andhra Pradesh, triggered by a spate of client suicides which exposed
predatory lending, market oversaturation, dishonest interest rates, and coercive
recovery practices (Dharker 2010; MacRae 2010; Kinetz 2010). Given the high
interest rates which ensure accumulation by the financier, and the incapacity of
4See also Karlan and Zinman (2009), Bannerjee et. al. (2009), both in their original 2009
versions; or more recently Strauss (2010).
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microfinance as a concept to achieve a more equitable distribution of factors of
production, it is not the “modern Robin Hood”which some5 have claimed, but
rather it upholds an unjust status quo and exploitative relationships. As Servet
(2010: 12) elucidates, the neo-liberal accumulation system led to a deterioration
of labour compensation in favour of capital, and for large sections of the popu-
lation in several countries, the need to compensate this loss in purchasing power
by resorting more and more to credit. In the case of micro-credit, there does not
seem to be a monetary relationship of the type employer/employee type, and
this could suggest that there is no exploitation of workers. [...] But all in all, the
interest payments for the loans which enable production or exchange activities
to be carried out, correspond to a levy on the income obtained through these
activities. There is no capital/labour relation at interpersonal level. But as a
whole, there is transfer from one sector to another.
Despite its questionability as a replacement for social policies, microfinance is
increasingly also explored as a tool providing public goods. Underlying this
notion is a paradigm shift noted by Reis and Mollinga (2009: 3): “Due to the
finance gap in the RWSS6 sector and the paradigm of cost-recovery, microcredit
schemes have globally become a popular element of RWSS policies in recent
years.”We may understand this paradigm as favouring a micro-privatisation of
public goods. Developing countries, and especially their poorer sections, cru-
cially suffer from an underprovision of the public goods necessary for economic
and social development; this underprovision ranges from roads and public in-
frastructure like water and sanitation, electricity provision and irrigation, to
education and health services. With the exception only of roads, microfinance
has been proposed as a means of achieving or improving the provision of all of
the above.7
5Byström (2006)
6RWSS = Rural water supply and sanitation
7Electricity: Kabir et. al. (2010); irrigation: Muhammad (2005); health: Parker/Singh
(2000), Pronyk et. al. (2007), Dohn et. al. (2004); education: Khumawala (2009), Leather-
man/Dunford (2010); water and sanitation are dealt with further below.
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3 THEORY
Microfinance and water have been linked for some time. For example, political
fault lines over water and microfinance ran parallel in the Bolivian crisis of
2000 (Rhyne 2001; Greeley 2006). But beyond the apparent policy symbiosis of
microfinance and public sector restructuring, the case for providing water and
sanitation via microfinance has been made since the mid-1990s. It is based on
a set of rather bold assumptions: “Municipal or state-owned utilities are often
ineffi cient, overregulated, and unable to supply even the formal sector with
adequate services. Subsidies through tax transfers and foreign aid/borrowing
are becoming more diffi cult to secure.” (Varley 1995: 5) The public sector
is understood here as by definition incapable, and aid and tax transfers will
naturally decline over time.
The central premise held by advocates of microfinance solutions is that small
loans from private MFIs can and will, given the appropriate programme design,
act as a substitute for the commitment of the public sector. MFIs are expected
to realise the profit opportunities presented by specialised loans for education,
health or water and sanitation, and the borrowers, on the other hand, are to
grasp these loans as an entrepreneurial opportunity for the betterment of their
livelihoods. Given the tangibility and immediate observability of the resources
involved, water and sanitation can be understood as a crucial case for testing
the assertion that, in developing countries, tiny loans to households can be a
means for providing and governing public goods —goods which in richer coun-
try contexts are provided and/or strongly regulated by the public sector. The
research presented in this contribution examines that assertion in relation to
specific projects, and presents some of the first empirical evidence challenging
the notion that microfinance could lead to an adequate provision.
Microfinance-based approaches to the provision of water and sanitation pos-
tulate a “win-win” situation of financial benefits accruing to households, and
internalisable profits for suppliers of water and credit. They are understood
as “leveraging market-based resources”(Mehta/Knapp 2004: 13). The central
implicit premise is that a private credit system —privately provided through
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MFIs, privately used by households —offers poor people a welcome opportunity
to self-finance their own access to water and sanitation, and enables service
providers (of water, sanitation, and credit) to recover their full costs. “Expe-
rience in microenterprise lending has demonstrated that cost recovery should
be central rather than peripheral to the design of sustainable financing mecha-
nisms.” (Varley 1995: 3)
Households’ investments in latrines and water connections in this story are
premised upon the household decision-makers recognising the private benefits
from clean water and sanitation, which would incentivise the household to take
on debt now in order to accrue future returns. Among the commonly assumed
motivators for households are savings in medical bills, extra earnings due to
better health, and time saved by female household members which could be
invested in productive activities, raising household income. Any risk is borne
entrepreneurially by the household. Supporters of microfinance models warn
against public subsidies for household water and sanitation, for fear of “crowd-
ing out potential private sector resources” (Mehta/Knapp 2004: 12). An en-
abling environment for private investment is therefore identified as a prerequi-
site (Agbenorheri/Fonseca 2005: 13; Mehta et. al. 2007), since water projects
are supposed to learn from the private enterprise successes of MFIs (Intellecap
2009).
As we show here, the non-private characteristics of the resources involved con-
found a simple market-oriented approach as is usually taken by advocates of
microfinance for household water and sanitation. Some arguments using eco-
nomic theory are to be made for an understanding of these as non-private goods.
Economics traditionally distinguishes between four types of goods — private
goods, public goods, club goods and common-pool resources —and treats the
existence of public goods as an instance of market failure. Market-oriented ra-
tional behaviour of individual gain-seeking will not produce “effi cient”(desired)
quantities of public goods, since all positive externalities cannot be priced into
the goods by market participants. A decentralised system of decision-making
cannot optimally determine the levels of collective consumption (Samuelson,
1954: 388). Resources with public goods characteristics therefore will be under-
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provided, unless collective-action means for their provision are found.
Complicating an economic analysis of public goods is the rarity of pure public
or private goods. Outside of parsimonious theory, most goods actually lie on a
continuum between public and private, and as to where exactly the line between
public and private goods runs, economic theory offers only deceptively precise
boundaries. The categories of non-excludability and non-rivality rarely provide
for a clean categorisation, and furthermore, these categories themselves can
conflict with societal institutions defining what is a commonly-managed resource
(and how it is to be managed) versus what is a private good. The exclusion
of some members of society from the use of a resource may be normatively
regarded as repulsive, especially when the governance of natural resources has
traditionally been organised in a collective manner. This applies particularly
to goods which constitute essentials of a ‘decent life’or which have an intrinsic
value and yield public benefits (Kaul/Mendoza 2003).
Many, if not most goods, could technically be made excludable with techno-
logical advancement, just as most goods, when pushed to the extreme, become
rivalrous —even air. But in making the distinction between excludable and non-
excludable, rivalrous and non-rivalrous, economics follows a mistaken distinction
between public and private along the “inherent properties”of a good. Rather,
as Malkin and Wildavsky (1991: 355) argue, the true distinction is in practice
socially constructed: public goods “are public because and only because society
chooses to put the goods in the public sector instead of the private sector.” For
this reason, Kaul and Mendoza differentiate between “basic”(non-rival or non-
excludable) and “actual”properties of goods: “those that society has assigned
to them”.
In lieu of a clean categorisation, we should recognise that household water
and sanitation display important “basic”and “actual”characteristics qualifying
them for an evaluation as non-private goods, especially at a level of basic provi-
sion. The provision of water and sanitation depends on and affects underlying
common-pool resources, which require collective-action solutions for their man-
agement. Unregulated, un-coordinated private use will tend to deplete the re-
sources. One household’s consumption, for instance through a private borewell,
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drains the common groundwater resource, and similarly one household’s lack of
access to adequate sanitation (going instead for open defecation) pollutes that
common resource. Supplying clean (potable) water and sanitation to unsupplied
or undersupplied households also represents a merit good, in that there are sig-
nificant benefits for the general public from each additional household’s access.
For instance, health gains are larger when they are well spread. A household
with access to clean drinking water and sanitary facilities is less likely to contract
and spread water-borne diseases, which regularly create high costs, unnecessary
suffering and foregone opportunities for communities.
Given the network characteristics of water and sanitation systems, significant
economies of scale in provision are attainable only by inclusive rather than pri-
vate access. Drilling borewells or laying water pipes to supply a single household
is highly ineffi cient when compared to supplying an entire street or neighbour-
hood. As a result, neither should it be desirable to exclude households from
the resource, nor is use of the resource strictly rivalrous, since one user’s access
depends substantially on the other’s access.8 Davis et. al. (2008: 5, my em-
phasis) only barely touch this point when they note that “preliminary results
suggest that microlending may be an effective means of helping households in
communities with existing trunk infrastructure to access improved water sup-
ply and sanitation services in their homes”. The question of where the trunk
infrastructure comes from is left aside.
Microfinance as a means for water and sanitation provision neglects such collective-
action aspects, and ignores the social embeddedness of water and sanitation
finance. Importantly, the social embeddedness of sanitary and water-related
practices is also all but ignored, at best noted in statements about the need
for “demand creation”(i.e. marketing against entrenched practices). While the
onus to take a loan for the purpose of investing in water and sanitation falls
squarely on the individual household, which on its own is expected to realise
a financial incentive to water and sanitation upgrading, that household actu-
8For basic sanitation, due to the use of simple (and only partly hygienic) systems such
as pit latrines, there are fewer economies to scale in supply; however, for advanced sanitary
systems involving piping and centralised sewage treatment, the same applies as to water.
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ally has no means of overcoming the above-described collective action dilemmas
or initiating the required social change. Sanitary and water-related practices
are grounded in social norms of propriety, socially embedded through peer em-
ulation and collective rituals (even fetching water is a social event), and are
path-dependent through habituation.
4 EVIDENCE FROM THE FIELD
In this section, we present empirical evidence; first, we discuss the findings made
by Reis and Mollinga in Vietnam, and follow with our own findings from field-
work conducted in Andhra Pradesh in southern India between January and July
2010. At present, these are the only known empirical social science investiga-
tions of cases in which microfinance were used for water and sanitation.
4.1 VIETNAM
In the southern Vietnamese Can Tho District, Reis and Mollinga (2009) found
catastrophic sanitary conditions, as most rural and peri-urban households used
the same rivers and canals for sewage disposal on which they traditionally de-
pended for drinking and domestic water. Pesticides and industrial waste ad-
ditionally contaminated the watercourses. They especially depended on these
water sources during the dry season, but households usually used a mix of piped
water (where available), rapidly depleting wells, rainwater, river water and other
minor sources. Many households within pipe-supplied areas could not afford the
administrative and technical costs of a connection, especially since the rural set-
ting incurred a high cost for piping from the mains to the house, which the water
board would not fund.
In a programme begun in 2004, microloans of up to 3̃20 Euros supplied with
a low nominal (negative real) interest rate were channelled from the Vietnam
Bank for Social Policies (VBSP) via local credit groups to households seeking
to upgrade their water and/or sanitation facilities. The predicted full cost of
the various latrine options was between 40 and 160 Euros (though households
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complained that the costs were really far higher), in an area where the monthly
per capita poverty line is 8 Euros. Originally, the programme ran into a lack of
demand from its intended beneficiaries, as a local Women’s Union representative
reported:
At the beginning, it was very diffi cult to persuade them (the households) to
build the latrines. But once one household started, the others saw the good
example and it encouraged them to do the same. (ibid. 12)
Local perceptions of modernity and progress played an important role in this
copy-cat outcome. In practice, the programme managed to somewhat increase
rural sanitation access, though only the most expensive (160+ Euro) type of la-
trine which included a septic tank, was ever constructed. Cheaper options were
not perceived by the people as an improvement over their traditional systems
(especially the “fish pond” toilet), which ultimately polluted common water-
ways.
It has further been observed that the factor ‘modernity’ is a major incentive
for rural households regarding the construction of a new latrine. [...] Having
a septic tank latrine plays the role of a status symbol, which a simple latrine
model cannot fulfil. This is also illustrated by the term ‘beautiful latrine’, which
was often used by interviewees to describe their new toilets, and by the pride
with which households presented them. (ibid.: 13)
The question of long-term sustainability was however avoided, as it was found
that households and offi cials were unaware of, or indifferent to, the fact that
septic tanks would have to be emptied within around 10 to 20 years, which at
present was technically impossible (except by hand) due to the narrow roads
in the area. It also appeared that the implementation only of more expensive
schemes excluded poor households, and thereby the project did not attain the
intended impact. Poorer households were often also precluded from access to
credit, through exclusion and self-exclusion, and excluded through the technol-
ogy.
As demonstrated earlier, the largest share of the budget is used by households
which construct septic tank latrines. These households usually have access to
tap or well water, because the latrine requires “plenty of water for flushing”
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(according to MoH decision 08/2005). It was not observed that any of these
households did not have access to tap or well water. This also indicates that
the programme mainly reaches medium-income and better-off households, for
which clean water supply is mostly not problematic. (ibid.: 18)
On the water side, Reis and Mollinga were presented with a mystery. Despite
the project’s aim to increase piped water access through microfinance loans,
no new water connections were to be found; only some wells had been dug,
despite a condition prohibiting this in order to prevent further groundwater
depletion. An effective and relatively affordable ( 1̃00 Euro) household water
filtration system for contaminated water, which was locally developed and in-
tended for roll-out through the project, was never implemented. Local offi cials
and project authorities explained the lop-sided emphasis on sanitation as re-
sulting from greater demand for latrines, claiming that access to clean water
was already widespread; Reis and Mollinga found this not to be true. Instead,
they found the redirection of water loans toward sanitation aligned with the
business interests of local construction firms grown since the liberalisation of
the Vietnamese economy; key figures in the water supply companies were simul-
taneously owners of construction companies for centralised purification systems,
and they affected the flow of funds in the project. The authors note, “it is to be
seen in this context that the interest of government agencies, as well as offi cials
as private persons, are highly interwoven with the business interest of private
enterprises that are contracted to carry out public tasks.” (ibid.: 17)
4.2 ANDHRA PRADESH
The findings presented below from own fieldwork on a project9 in Andhra
Pradesh are of a different kind, but paint a similarly problematic picture. This
research was performed immediately before the advent of the latest microfinance
crisis, and therefore only marginally connects with the recent events, but the
water and sanitation project should be considered against the background of
the overindebtedness and predatory lending now known.
9Names and identity markers of the actors and people involved have been left out since
some of the involved parties have stated their preference to remain anonymous.
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The project began in 2009 as a pilot project in three sites: two medium-sized
rural municipalities of approximately 150,000 inhabitants, and one large munic-
ipality of nearly 900,000 inhabitants on the outskirts of Hyderabad, the state
capital. The project targeted poorer underserved areas within the municipal-
ities. Groundwater in Andhra Pradesh is rapidly depleting, and Hyderabad
has had to enhance its own supply with a massive inter-basin transfer scheme
over more than 120 kilometres, lifted by 400 metres. One of the two smaller
towns studied lies in a coastal floodplain, where groundwater is contaminated
with a high fluoride concentration which causes bone and joint disease (Inter-
view, 25.05.2010), while the other lies in the driest region of South India, which
has been additionally highly rainfall-deficient in recent years. Especially in the
smaller towns, people regularly suffer from throat infections, jaundice and diar-
rhoea as a result of unsafe tap water (Interview, 17.02.2010). In Hyderabad, in
2009, fourteen people died from an E-coli infection spread through the municipal
water supply (Times of India 2010). All three municipalities had experienced
rapid growth in recent decades; the Hyderabad suburb even more than doubling
its population in the past ten census years. The municipalities are still trying
to catch up with the sanitation needs projected in the 1990s, as a Municipal
Commissioner explained (Interview: 02.07.2010). All three municipalities do
not manage to supply poor areas reliably with water; many areas only receive
water for half an hour, or one hour, every other day, through private and pub-
lic taps (on-street public taps are relatively widespread). Some parts are only
supplied by water tanker.
The project consisted of three distinct elements: (1) household water tap con-
nections; (2) household sanitary latrines (pit latrines, or with sewer connection);
(3) construction and operation of communal drinking water plants (Reverse Os-
mosis/RO plants). Funding came via a grant from a large American foundation,
which gave a 50 percent subsidy (approx. 80 Euros) towards the estimated con-
struction cost of a latrine or water connection. The other 50 percent came from
sundry microfinance providers: formal (MFIs) and informal (moneylenders).
The subsidies were disbursed through a regional NGO working with women’s
Self-Help Groups (SHGs). SHG membership was a criterion for household par-
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ticipation, since SHG Federations, consisting of the elected representatives of 20
to 40 SHGs each, were to act as financial intermediaries as well as the organisa-
tional nexus. Offi cially, the role of the NGO was “capacity-building”, though in
practice its employees’functions would be best described as a mixture project
co-ordinator, training provider, financial auditor and, whenever necessary, disci-
pliner —in around 25 percent of SHG Federation meetings attended, the (male)
NGO workers spent some time publicly scolding the (all-female) SHG repre-
sentatives for various laxities and oversights in credit provision and project
supervision, and sometimes withheld funds. The project was furthermore given
some infrastructural and financial support by the state government’s urban de-
velopment programme, MEPMA10 .
Averaged over the three sites, 44 percent of eligible non-served households en-
rolled for the project’s latrine subsidy, and 33 percent for the water tap subsidy.
As the project’s director explained, the improvements were premised on people’s
self-identification of their need.
So we asked the community: if you need it, and you also recognise the impor-
tance, then you pay 50 percent, it is an asset for you. Otherwise you can also
build fully through your funds. So now, this is the opportunity to build your
own asset at 50 percent, the remaining 50 percent come from other sources.
(Interview, 16.02.2010)
At the time of research —which consisted of participant observation and semi-
structured interviews with SHG members, NGO workers, municipal offi cials and
academic experts —the project was far behind its own schedule. Of at least 8
communal RO plants planned, only 3 had been built and were operational; the
foundations for 2 others existed, but were abandoned. The RO plants were
funded 50 percent by the American foundation and 50 percent by the state de-
velopment agency, MEPMA. Two of those that were operational were located
in the dry, fluoride-affected region, and had attracted a growing number of sev-
eral hundred households who regularly purchased 12L cans of drinking water
at approximately 0.04 Euros. The RO plants represented something of a com-
munal enterprise offering employment opportunities for several SHG ladies as
10MEPMA = Mission for the Elimination of Poverty in Urban Areas
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attendants earning a monthly wage between 32 and 48 Euros under the direct
supervision of the SHG Federation.
For the purposes of this paper, it can be concluded that these RO plants provided
an apparently valuable service to the community, albeit without any involve-
ment of microfinance. Even so, the majority of RO plants was not en route to
completion; two were stopped due to local political contentions. Elected leaders
of other backward castes (OBCs), who were not included in the project, had
blocked the construction of one plant. As one NGO worker explained: “They
prefer to be famous for preventing something good than not to be involved in
it.” (Interview, 24.06.2010) Evidently, the local leadership had been by-passed.
In another town, a political party was blocking the construction of an RO plant
in one of “its”neighbourhoods for as long as the rival party ruled the municipal-
ity. Infrastructure projects in India are invested with high prestige for political
figures, and it appears from this case that the political realm is a key for success
or failure.
As for the household water and sanitation improvements, a year after demand
appraisal, merely 11.7 percent of the approved 2925 household water connections
and 9.7 percent of the 2688 sanitary facilities had been provided. It is important
to note here that “provision”refers not to delivery of a complete product, but
to full disbursement of the 50 percent subsidy —the household must complete
part of the construction before half of the subsidy is disbursed, and finish the
roof before the other half is disbursed. During site visits, only a relatively small
number of constructions were found actively in progress, and some completed
toilets were not being used; household members were not comfortable using them
yet. It was explained, mystifyingly, that they were not perceived as “completed”
before a plaque with the name of the NGO and the funders had been attached.
A number of other facilities were being used as storage space, and many toilets
had been integrated into new extensions or additions to the house, in line with
the idea of “assisted incremental housing”espoused by John Turner (1976), but
the aspect of modern sanitation often seemed of secondary importance.
It is possible to identify several reasons for the slow progress and low uptake,
which include the limited financial capacities of the intended beneficiaries to
Philip Mader - ATTEMPTING THE PRODUCTION OF PUBLIC GOODS
THROUGH MICROFINANCE: THE CASE OF WATER AND SANITATION
Economic Research - Ekonomska Istrazivanja Vol. 25, SE 1, 2012 Page:205
undertake such investments (even with a subsidy and a loan), as well as oc-
casionally lack of space, space use restricted due to vastu shastra11 principles,
and lack of secure land use rights since land was formally squatted. Tenants of
rented houses naturally declined to invest in their landlord’s house. However,
most importantly, households were expected to obtain loans for the other 50
percent of the cost from external providers; and it was found that most had
no trouble whatsoever accessing finance. Most had microfinance loans, and
many had several loans both from formal and informal sources (a finding which,
in hindsight, against the background of the now-evolving microfinance crisis,
should have been explored in greater depth). But given this pre-existing access
to finance evidently without the 50 percent subsidy few would have undertaken
a water or sanitation construction; deductively, a full cost recovery approach
would not have been viable.
The key weakness appeared to be a failure to engage with the existing structural
constraints on household water and sanitation, which lay at a higher level than
a project could address through individual household finance. In this sense, the
“blame”for a possible non-completion of the projected improvements would lie
with none of the project’s implementing agents — the foundation, the NGO,
the municipality, the SHGs or their Federations —but with the premise itself
that household access to finance was the key constraint. Water taps depend
crucially on the capacity of the municipal water board to deliver, which in these
municipalities, it could not. NGO workers regularly and positively interacted
with municipal employees, who were receptive to their suggestions and needs,
but the underlying problems could not be tackled by the project; at best they
were moderated for those who happened to be in reach of existing supply sys-
tems. Where taps were being provided, they were only demanded by 38 percent
of households, of which 17 percent had completed their work within the year.
Many households apparently saw no improvement in having to pay 1̃.60 Euros
per month for the same irregular and insuffi cient water service as was available
from public taps on the street; those who did were building storage tanks on
11For instance, water should not be placed in a certain corner of the house according to
these ancient Indian laws.
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their property at additional cost, to collect water from their tap whenever it
would run, for later use. In one town (dry region), no tap connections had been
provided at all; this town was faced with a severe water shortage and was in the
process of constructing a large new storage reservoir, after which taps may also
be provided.
These weaknesses are symptoms of a long-term underinvestment in water and
sanitation in India, exacerbated by liberalisation, as well as of an inequitable
distribution of the available resources (Interview with former Hyderabad town
planner, 19.02.2010). The effects are perhaps most starkly illustrated in Hy-
derabad, where upscale neighbourhoods benefit from suffi cient and suffi ciently
reliable water provision (and so does a Hindustan Beverages/Coca-Cola bottling
plant in nearby Ameenpur), but entire peripheral districts have no piped supply
and must be supplied with tankers12 .
The smaller two towns both have no sewer system, so any sewage must be
deposited in private septic tanks. Municipal offi cials considered a sewage system
an important investment for their town, but found it far beyond their financial
means (multiple interviews). In greater Hyderabad, the sewerage system does
not extend to most poor neighbourhoods, and therefore here too usually septic
tanks must be constructed (though in a few target neighbourhoods, toilets will
be connected to existing mains). As in Vietnam, no plans had been made from
within the project for the emptying of septic tanks. NGO workers did not know
how long it would take until tanks would have to be emptied, nor did how it
would be organised when the time came. “They [the beneficiaries] will take
care of it then and maybe they will take a loan.” (Interview with NGO offi cer,
20.06.2010)
It is interesting to note the motivations of the households who applied for the
sanitation subsidy, which were at odds with the theory that households will
undertake sanitation upgrading as an investment in their health. Instead of
pointing to diseases, which was rarely the case, the interviewed SHG members
12 In one neighbourhood on the outskirts of Hyderabad, the tanker arrived while I was touring
the neighbourhood. Women came running from houses in all directions with containers in
order to secure their share of this water, as it was unclear when the next tanker would arrive.
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repeatedly named three (unexpected) concerns about their present sanitary sit-
uation (two of which were linked with local social codes compelling women to go
for open defecation at night only). They were: fear of wild animals (especially
snakes), fear of rape (circumscribed as “drunken men”or ”dangerous fellows”),
and increasing pressures of urbanisation. The latter was especially marked in
the Hyderabad suburb, where open areas and brushland previously used for
defecation were rapidly being developed. Given these immediate pressures, it
is surprising that only 44 percent of households planned to construct a latrine;
especially since sharing a facility is very uncommon (interview with municipal
offi cial, 17.02.2010).
Overall, it was apparent that relatively better-off households (e.g. with brick
houses) were most likely to undertake the investment. The higher-rank women in
the SHG Federations, who were tasked with educating SHG members about the
health benefits of sanitary latrines, repeatedly expressed their concern that the
poorer members were excluded by the cost of constructing a latrine; as a result
the neighbourhood would remain filthy, and one household’s non-participation
created a cost to the entire community. The NGO’s employees repeatedly made
it clear that they did not expect the project to reach very poor households. It
appears that a more collective, inclusive solution must be found in order to solve
this problem.
5 CONCLUSION
The empirical cases from Vietnam and Andhra Pradesh call into question some
presumptions made by advocates of microfinance for water and sanitation. On
the whole, it appears that microfinance for water and sanitation tackles symp-
toms, not causes, of the underprovision of water and sanitation to the poor.
These causes would have to be located in larger collective failures (such as
public sector capacity) and unequal access rights ultimately stemming from in-
equitable social relations and an increasingly unequal ownership of the means
of production. It can be seen that, much like the theory section of this paper
has argued, some important collective action problems and larger institutional
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failings exist which the microfinance loans themselves cannot tackle. These in-
clude population pressure (Andhra Pradesh), contamination of water (naturally
and by industry and agriculture —Vietnam and Andhra Pradesh), climate (and
perhaps climate change —Andhra Pradesh), perceptions of modernity and pro-
priety (Vietnam and Andhra Pradesh), local corruption and adverse business
interests (Vietnam), opposition from local politicians (Andhra Pradesh), land
rights insecurity (Andhra Pradesh), the incapacity of public providers to reach
the poor (Vietnam and Andhra Pradesh), caste dynamics (Andhra Pradesh),
and the inequitable distribution of available resources (Andhra Pradesh). It
almost appears as if the one element not missing was household access to loans.
Economically, we should beware of an emergent micro-privatisation of public
goods through microfinance, which would move their governance from the pub-
lic realm into the sphere of private capital markets based on the cost-recovery
paradigm. Given the insight from economic theory that resources with public
goods characteristics will be underprovided unless collective-action methods for
their provision are found, the lack of safe water and sanitation in poor com-
munities can be understood as resulting from too much market, or at least too
little public activity. We may also learn from the recent financial crisis about
the potential risks of financial “innovations”; and question the innovation of
microfinance against that background. Credit to the previously uncreditworthy
is hardly the key to economic and social development.
From a political viewpoint, the fact that local political institutions (which in
India are democratic) were in some cases bypassed and alienated, rather than
strengthened, is a concern. While SHGs and their Federations apparently can
act as viable institutions for the governance of social projects, it is important
to prevent an ineffi cient and rivalrous process of parallel institution-building
(whether by MFIs, SHGs or others) which alienates existing local political in-
stitutions. More research will be needed to deepen an understanding of the in-
stitutional environment, and to determine whether such interactions are unique
to these cases, or likely to be systematic.
On a broader level, this contribution has left aside the normative implications
of requiring the poor to pay for their access to water and sanitation, or in-
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deed any of the public goods with which they are currently underserved. As
briefly discussed in the “Theory” section, the line between public and private
goods is a socially constructed one, so that even if it were possible to extend
water and sanitation using microfinance loans, society may still wish to do oth-
erwise — as Vandana Shiva (2006) has stated: “Rights cannot be substituted
by credit.” Perhaps the present time of economic turmoil is the right time to
question the equitability of a social order which denies many their access to es-
sential resources, and to abandon approaches based on debt. The loan costs of
microfinance —in Andhra Pradesh up to 60 percent effective interest per annum
(Shridhar 2010) —would raise the price for water and sanitation improvements
for the poor by the factor of interest.
Since 2002 there exists an internationally codified Human Right to Water under
the ICESCR (ECOSOC 2003), which includes sanitation. “Categorizing a right
to water as a human right means that: fresh water is an entitlement, rather
than a commodity or service provided on a charitable basis; achieving basic
and improved levels of access should be accelerated; the “least served”are bet-
ter targeted and therefore inequalities decreased; communities and vulnerable
groups will be empowered to take part in decision-making processes.” (Bluemel
2004) It should be clear that projects premised on the responsibility of their
intended beneficiaries to take on debt detract from that fundamental right in-
stead of fulfilling it. As Rosemann (2005) has argued, an approach based not on
cost recovery from those least-suited to bear the costs stands a good chance. To
conclude with an illustration: the Millennium Development Goal of halving the
number of people without access to water and sanitation in sub-Saharan Africa
could be reached with a financial transfer from every person in the 15 countries
of Western Europe of only 4.80 US Dollars per year.
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